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Proving Genocide: The High Standards of the International Court of
Justice. By Peter Tzeng
On February 3, 2015, the International Court of Justice rendered a final
judgment in the Croatian Genocide case.' Between 1991 and 1995, ethnic
Serbs and Croats had systematically killed, tortured, and raped members of
each other's ethnic group on Croatian territory. 2 The Court thus found that the
actus reus of genocide (genocidal acts) had been established,3 but it applied
very high standards of proof for establishing the dolus specialis of genocide
(genocidal intent),4 leading it to dismiss both Croatia and Serbia's claims of
genocide.5 Since the Court's first pronouncement of the high standards of proof
for genocide in the 2007 Bosnian Genocide case, 6 many commentators have
criticized it,7 while others have expressed their support.8 Yet even this latter
group of commentators would acknowledge that the standards, even if
completely justifiable, have not been adequately justified by the Court.
In accordance with the civil law tradition,9 the International Court of
Justice has historically refrained from articulating consistent standards of
proof°10 Instead, it has employed flexible terminology such as
"(in)sufficient, "satisfqying],," 2  "convincing,"' 13  "conclusive,"' 14  and
1. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Croat. v. Serb.) (Croatian Genocide), Merits (Int'l Ct. Justice Feb. 3, 2015), http://www.icj
-cij.org/docket/files/1 18/18422.pdf.
2. Id. 208, 295, 360, 485, 493, 495-96.
3. Id. 401,499.
4. Id. 77 148, 178.
5. Id. 441,522.
6. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro) (Bosnian Genocide), Merits, 2007 I.C.J. 43 (Feb. 26).
7. E.g., Susana SdCouto, Reflections on the Judgment of the International Court of Justice in
Bosnia's Genocide Case Against Serbia and Montenegro, 15 HUM. RTs. BRIEF 1, 2-3 (2007); David
Scheffer, The World Court's Fractured Ruling on Genocide, 2 GENOCIDE STUD. & PREVENTION 123,
125-29 (2007); Antonio Cassese, A Judicial Massacre, GUARDIAN, Feb. 27, 2007,
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2007/feb/27/thejudicialmassacreofsrebr; Ruth Wedgwood,
Op-Ed, Slobodan Milosevic's Last Waltz, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com
/2007/03/12/opinion/i 2wedgwood.html.
8. E.g., Lennert Breuker, The Nature of the Genocide Case, 2 HAGUE JUST. J. 44, 48-49
(2007); William A. Schabas, Genocide and the International Court of Justice: Finally, a Duty to Prevent
the Crime of Crimes, 2 GENOCIDE STUD. & PREVENTION 101, 108-09 (2007).
9. See ANNA RIDDELL & BRENDAN PLANT, EVIDENCE BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
OF JUSTICE 125 (2009); Anna Riddell, Evidence, Fact-Finding, and Experts, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 848, 860 (Cesare P.R. Romano et al. eds., 2014).
10. ROBERT KOLB, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 944-45 (2013); RIDDELL &
PLANT, supra note 9, at 126-27; Markus Benzing, Evidentiary Issues, in THE STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: A COMMENTARY 1234, 1265 (Andreas Zimmermann et al. eds., 2d
ed. 2012).
11. Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Merits, 2010 I.C.J. 14, 97 (Apr. 20);
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda) (Armed Activities),
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"decisive" 15 to describe the evidence that it requires. But not all of the Court's
judges have approved of this practice. In a separate opinion to the Oil Platforms
judgment, Judge Higgins demanded that the Court "make clear what standards
of proof it requires to establish what sorts of facts."'16 Less than two and a half
years later, Judge Higgins was elected President of the Court. Perhaps
unsurprisingly, the Court's first judgment during her presidency-the Bosnian
Genocide judgment-articulated a clear set of standards for proving genocide,
in particular a high standard for evidence' 7 and a high standard for inferences
of dolus specialis.'8 Although both of these standards were followed in
Croatian Genocide, the Court has yet to provide an explanation for why such
high standards are appropriate in the context of proving genocide.19
The Court's high standard for evidence was best summarized in Bosnian
Genocide: "The Court has long recognized that claims against a State involving
charges of exceptional gravity must be proved by evidence that is fully
conclusive., 20 At first glance, this high standard2' might have intuitive appeal.
After all, the International Criminal Court (ICC), 22 International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR),23 and International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) z4 apply similarly high standards for evidence of
genocide. But unlike the International Court of Justice, they are in the industry
of incarcerating individuals. As the U.S. Supreme Court has held on multiple
occasions, the primary rationale behind the high standard of proof in U.S. law
Merits, 2005 I.C.J. 168, 230 (Dec. 19); Oil Platforms (U.S. v. Iran), Merits, 2003 I.C.J. 161, 190 (Nov.
6); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.) (Nicaragua), Merits,
1986 I.C.J. 14, 62 (June 27); Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Merits, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 16 (Apr. 9).
12. Armed Activities, 2005 I.C.J. at 201; Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 24.
13. ArmedActivities, 2005 I.C.J. at 208; Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 24.
14. Armed Activities, 2005 I.C.J. at 268; Oil Platforms, 2003 I.C.J. at 195; Corfu Channel,
1949 I.C.J. at 17.
15. Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 16.
16. Oil Platforms, 2003 I.C.J. at 234 (separate opinion of Judge Higgins). Judge Buergenthal
similarly criticized the vague standards of proof in his separate opinion. Oil Plaforms, 2003 I.C.J. at
286-87 (separate opinion of Judge Buergenthal).
17. See infra note 20 and accompanying text.
18. See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
19. Commentators have attempted to explain the high standards by noting that a finding of
genocide would carry a grave stigma, and could also entail significant financial liabilities. Breuker,
supra note 8, at 49; Schabas, supra note 8, at 108. Nevertheless, the Court does not provide an
explanation.
20. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro) (Bosnian Genocide), Merits, 2007 I.C.J. 43, 129 (Feb.
26) (citing Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 17). The standard was followed in Croatian Genocide.
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croat. v.
Serb) (Croatian Genocide), Merits, 178 (Int'l Ct. Justice Feb. 3, 2015), http://www.icj
-cij.org/docket/files/1 18/18422.pdf (quoting Bosnian Genocide, 2007 I.C.J. at 129).
21. The standard "fully conclusive" is arguably very close to the standard of "beyond a
reasonable doubt." See Benzing, supra note 10, at 1265-66; Jos6 E. Alvarez, Burdens of Proof" Notes
from the President, 23 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. NEWSLETTER 1, 7 (2007). Indeed, the Court later in the
Bosnian Genocide judgment required certain facts to be established "beyond any doubt." Bosnian
Genocide, 2007 I.C.J. at 218.
22. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 66(3), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S.
90.
23. ICTR, Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Apr. 10, 2013), r. 87(A).
24. ICTY, Rules of Procedure and Evidence (May 22, 2013), r. 87(A).
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for a criminal conviction is that an individual is at risk of losing his or her
liberty. 25 A finding of genocide by the International Court of Justice, on the
other hand, would not put anyone behind bars. So why should the gravity of a
charge affect the standard of proof
The ICJ has never answered this question. The one case it cites for this
"long recognized" standard,26 Corfu Channel, does not provide any justification
either. In Corfu Channel, the United Kingdom sought to show that Yugoslavia
had laid mines in Albanian territorial waters. In evaluating the evidence, the
Court held that "[a] charge of such exceptional gravity against a State would
require a degree of certainty that has not been reached here."27 Yet the context
suggests that the Court was only emphasizing that the degree of certainty
reached in that instance was too low: the evidence in question was a single
Yugoslav Lieutenant-Commander's double hearsay testimony. 28 The Court in
Bosnian Genocide and Croatian Genocide, however, emphasized the converse,
namely that the degree of certainty required for "[a] charge of such exceptional
gravity" should be very high. In any case, even if this interpretation were
appropriate, the Court still has never-not in Corfu Channel, nor Bosnian
Genocide, nor Croatian Genocide-explained why a higher degree of certainty
should be required for charges of exceptional gravity.
The Court has likewise never justified its high standard for inferences of
dolus specialis. The standard was most precisely articulated in Croatian
Genocide: "[I]n order to infer the existence of dolus specialis from a pattern of
conduct, it is necessary and sufficient that this is the only inference that could
reasonably be drawn from the acts in question., 29 This standard of "only
reasonable inference" is extremely difficult to meet; indeed, the Court rejected
Croatia's strongest claims of genocide by noting that in some instances the
Serbs had only forcibly displaced, not killed, ethnic Croats, from which it could
be inferred that the Serbs aimed only to expel Croat populations, not to destroy
them (as dolus specialis requires). 30 The ICC,31 ICTR,32 and ICTY33 apply the
25. E.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 755 (1982); Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432
U.S. 233, 241 (1977); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970).
26. Bosnian Genocide, 2007 I.C.J. at 129 (citing Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Merits, 1949
I.C.J. 4, 17 (Apr. 9)).
27. Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 17.
28. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Oral Proceedings (First Part), 1950 I.C.J. Pleadings 166,
635 (Nov. 26, 1948).
29. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Croat. v. Serb.) (Croatian Genocide), Merits, 148 (Int'l Ct. Justice Feb. 3, 2015),
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/1 18/18422.pdf (citing Bosnian Genocide, 2007 I.C.J. at 196-97). The
Court did not use the adverb "reasonably" in the Bosnian Genocide judgment, but it stated in the
Croatian Genocide judgment that reasonableness had been implied in the Bosnian Genocide judgment.
Id.
30. Id. 435. The Court made similar findings in Bosnian Genocide. Bosnian Genocide, 2007
I.C.J. at 196.
31. E.g., Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision on the Prosecution's
Application for a Warrant of Arrest Against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, 158 (Mar. 4, 2009).
32. E.g., Nchamihigo v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-2001-63-A, Appeals Chamber,
Judgement, 80 (Mar. 18, 2010); Prosecutor v. Nzabonimana, Case No. ICTR-98-44D-T, Trial
Chamber, Judgement and Sentence, 75 (May 31, 2012).
33. E.g., Prosecutor v. Krstid, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals Chamber, Judgement, 41 (Int'l
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same high standard for inferences, but, as discussed above, the consequences of
their convictions are different from those of the Court. So there must be a
separate reason why the Court finds that the high standard should apply.
Once again, however, the Court does not explain its reasoning. In fact, the
Court does not even cite to prior authority, though the standard-at least in
public international law-can once again be traced back to Corfu Channel.
After the United Kingdom failed to show that Yugoslavia had laid the mines, it
argued that one could infer that Albania must have, at the very least, had
knowledge of the mine laying. 34 In setting a standard for inferential reasoning,
the Court held that "indirect evidence... must be regarded as of special weight
when it is based on a series of facts linked together and leading logically to a
single conclusion,, 35 and that "proof may be drawn from inferences of fact,
provided that they leave no room for reasonable doubt." 36 The Court, however,
moderated this high standard by noting that if the evidence is in the exclusive
control of one state, the other state "should be allowed a more liberal recourse
to inferences of fact and circumstantial evidence. 37 The Court in Bosnian
Genocide and Croatian Genocide, however, appears to have applied the high
standard without the moderating principle. Although it is widely recognized
that proof of dolus specialis, a mental state, is often in the exclusive control of
38the perpetrator, the Court in both Bosnian Genocide and Croatian Genocide
apparently did not allow more liberal recourse to inferences of fact and
circumstantial evidence, as it strictly applied the "only reasonable inference"
test.
39
Defining standards of proof is not a trivial exercise. The Court's
dispositions in Bosnian Genocide and Croatian Genocide arguably turned on
the standards of proof, which exculpated the states in question from liability for
unforgivable genocidal acts. This is not to say that the Court's standards were
too high; that debate has been ongoing for years.4 ° But if the Court wishes to
follow Judge Higgins's recommendation to establish consistent standards of
proof, then at the very least the Court must accompany those standards with
41
well-reasoned justifications. Otherwise, we are left wondering whether
consistent standards are any better than inconsistent ones.
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 19, 2004); Prosecutor v. Tolimir, Case No. IT-05-88/2-T,
Trial Chamber, Judgement, 745 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 12, 2012).
34. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Merits, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 17 (Apr. 9).
35. Id. at 18.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Croat. v. Serb.) (Croatian Genocide), Merits, 143 (Int'l Ct. Justice Feb. 3, 2015),
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/1 18/18422.pdf ("The Parties agree that the dolus specialis . .. will
seldom be expressly stated."); Gacumbitsi v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-2001-64-A, Appeals Chamber,
Judgement, 40 (July 7, 2006) ("By its nature, [genocidal] intent is not usually susceptible to direct
proof."); Prosecutor v. Tolimir, 745 ("Indications of [genocidal] intent are rarely overt .... ).
39. Croatian Genocide, 440, 512; Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro) (Bosnian Genocide),
Merits, 2007 I.C.J. 43, 196-97 (Feb. 26).
40. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
41. For examples of potential justifications, see supra note 19.
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An Impossible Standard of Intent?: Croatia v. Serbia at the International
Court of Justice. By Tara Zivkovic
In 1999 the government of Croatia filed a lawsuit at the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) 1 against Serbia for acts of genocide committed between
1991 and 1995.2 Ten years later, Serbia retaliated with a countersuit arguing
that Croatia had also violated the 1948 Genocide Convention for crimes
committed against Serbian populations during the Balkan wars in 1995.3 In
February of this year-sixteen years after the original complaint was filed-the
ICJ unceremoniously dismissed both claims.
4
The ICJ's verdict in Croatia v. Serbia was entirely expected. International
legal experts, as well as the countries themselves, understood from the
beginning that their cases lacked a viable legal basis, mainly due to the highly
demanding standard for establishing 'genocidal intent' of the perpetrator under
international law.5 In proving intent, consistent with Article 2 of the Genocide
Convention, international courts have held that it is not sufficient to establish
that the offender meant to engage in an act of genocide; a prosecutor must also
demonstrate that the offender engaged in the conduct with the specific intent of
destroying "in full or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as
such."6 While the legal definition of genocide therefore requires both a physical
(actus reus) and mental (mens rea) element, proving the latter-known as the
dolus specialis, or the "specific intent" requirement-is exceptionally difficult.
7
Indeed, the ICJ has found only a single case of genocide from the Balkan wars:
the massacre of 8,000 Muslims in Srebrenica.
8
1. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is the primary judicial organ of the United
Nations.
2. See Application of Croatia, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croat. v. Yugoslavia), (Int'l Ct. Justice July 2, 1999),
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/1 18/7125.pdf.
3. See Counter-Memorial Submitted by the Republic of Serbia, Application of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croat. v. Serb.), 2009 I.C.J.
118 (Dec. 1).
4. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Croat. v. Serb.) (Croatian Genocide), Merits (Int'l Ct. Justice Feb. 3, 2015), http://www.icj
-cij.org/docket/files/1 18/18422.pdf.
5. See Marko Milanovid, State Responsibility for Genocide: A Follow-Up, 18 EUR. J. INT'L
L. 669 (2007).
6. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. II, Dec. 9,
1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
7. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRIME OF CRIMES 217-
25 (2d ed. 2009).
8. In 2007, the ICJ held in Bosnian Genocide that though Serbia had not committed genocide
in Bosnia it nevertheless had "violated the obligation to prevent genocide ... in respect of the genocide
that occurred in Srebrenica in July 1995." Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro) (Bosnian Genocide),
Merits, 2007 I.C.J. 43, 183 (Feb. 26).
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With a weak legal basis, the Croatia v. Serbia case, stretching over a
decade, was instead driven primarily by political considerations: a significant
portion of victims in both countries have yet to receive any legal recognition
for the crimes perpetrated against them.9 Politicians from each country, by
pursuing an ongoing trial at the ICJ, were able to claim to their local
populations that they were engaging in efforts of post-conflict justice, without
doing much of anything. 10 The case therefore serves as an important reminder:
international courts can sometimes be used as costly and unnecessary theaters
for political problems that should instead be dealt with domestically."
Although the recent ICJ judgment is in many ways anti-climactic, it still
presents a valuable opportunity to review the legal standing of genocide. I will
proceed by examining the necessary elements for substantiating a claim of
genocide under the Genocide Convention, paying specific attention to the
demanding requirement of dolus specialis as discussed by the majority opinion
in the Croatia v. Serbia decision. I will then consider whether genocide has
actually served as a productive legal category for addressing the atrocities
committed by governments during the Balkan wars.
The Genocide Convention makes clear that genocide is first and foremost
a crime of intent. Indeed, the "intent to destroy" requirement is directly related
to the specific wrong that genocide-as opposed to other crimes against
humanity-attempted to capture. Raphael Lemkin, a Polish lawyer, coined the
term in 1943 based on his belief that groups themselves are essential to
humanity, beyond the individuals that comprise them.12 As David Luban, a
scholar of international criminal law and legal ethics, aptly describes it: "to
annihilate a group is a crime that diminishes humanity over and above the loss
of the slaughtered individuals."'
' 3
Particularly striking is the fact that genocide is a crime whose legal
definition differs substantially from its common usage. The systematic killing
of an ethnic population, usually considered an obvious case of genocide, cannot
be classified as such absent the dolus specialis requirement. This is a subtle but
important legal distinction and is critical to understanding why the claims
brought by the two countries in Croatia v. Serbia were tenuous from the start.
The main argument dismissing both genocide claims rests precisely on the
distinction of genocide and ethnic cleansing: with no proof of genocidal intent,
acts of ethnic cleansing can only legally be classified as crimes against
humanity, and are subsequently outside of the jurisdiction of the ICJ in this
14
specific case.




12. SAMANTHA POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE 40-
45 (2002); see also SCHABAS, supra note 7.
13. David Luban, Calling Genocide By Its Rightful Name: Lemkin 's Word, Darfur, and the
UN Report, 7 CHI. J. INT'L L. 303, 309 (2006).
14. "Article 9 of the Genocide Convention stipulates that disputes arising out of the
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While acts of ethnic cleansing alone do not constitute genocide under the
Convention, they can be evidence of the actus reus of genocide.1 5 Indeed, in the
Croatia v. Serbia opinion, the Court acknowledged that genocidal acts by
Serbia had been established in certain instances against the Croats.' 6 Yet the
Court reiterated that forced displacements of an ethnic group only constitute
genocide if it is also proven that the displacements "were calculated to bring
about the physical destruction of the group."' 7 The Court posited instead that
the campaigns of mass extermination were committed for other purposes-
rendering certain regions ethnically homogenous, for example-rather than for
the specific intent of destroying an ethnic group.!s
Legal debate has centered on the necessary standard of proof for
establishing dolus specialis, particularly concerning how standards of proof
might differ for states as compared to individuals. 19 While the standard of proof
for individuals is supported by robust case law coming from various
international tribunals, the ICJ has had relatively few opportunities to clarify
the standard for dolus specialis as it pertains to states. In the previous genocide
case from the Balkan wars, Bosnia v. Serbia,20 the ICJ evaded the task of
providing a definite mens rea standard for state intent. Instead, the Court
argued that although genocide had been conclusively committed in Srebrenica,
there was no evidence that the government of Serbia was aware of the,
genocidal intent of the Bosnian leadership responsible for the massacre.
Lacking the knowledge requirement, the Court found there was no reason to
address the mens rea element, and ruled that Serbia was not responsible for the
genocide in Srebrenica.2 1
Like the Bosnia v. Serbia judgment, the ICJ in Croatia v. Serbia does
little to elucidate the legal uncertainty that surrounds the standard of proof for
dolus specilias as it applies to states. The opinion instead follows the standard
advanced by previous case law, holding that in the absence of direct evidence,
"specific intent" is most likely established through inference, for states and
22individuals alike. In line with judgments from the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the ICJ argues that the inference
of genocidal intent is proven if it is the "only reasonable inference" that can be
23drawn from the pattern of conduct. In other words, if a given pattern of
Convention may be submitted to the ICJ at the request of the parties involved." Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. II, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S.
277. The Court reiterated these boundaries in the Croatia v. Serbia opinion: it had no authority to
exercise jurisdiction over other crimes of war, including crimes against humanity. See Application of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croat. v. Serb.) (Croatian
Genocide), Merits, 84-89 (Int'l. Ct. Justice Feb. 3, 2015).
15. Croatian Genocide, 157, 158, 161, 166.
16. Id. 7 295, 360, 401.
17. Id. 160.
18. d. 426.
19. SCHABAS, supra note 7.
20. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro) (Bosnian Genocide), 2007 I.C.J. 43, 183 (Feb. 26).
21. Id. at 179.
22. Croatian Genocide, 147.
23. Id. 146.
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conduct potentially gives rise to more than one inference, genocidal intent
cannot be established.
The "only reasonable inference" standard is a stringent threshold, difficult
to prove both in cases in which the perpetrator is an individual, and arguably
even more challenging concerning the actions of a state-by nature, a complex
amalgam of different institutions and people.24 Indeed, international courts
dealing with the Balkan wars have found "genocidal intent" only in four cases,
all against individuals. A state has yet to be convicted.
This is troubling for many reasons, some of which were addressed in the
dissenting opinion of Croatia v. Serbia by the Brazilian Judge Cangado
Trindade. In his opinion, Judge Trindade argues that the ICJ has pursued "too
high a standard of proof for the determination of the occurrence of genocide., 26
This makes it nearly impossible for a state to be convicted-a problem, given
that genocide, by its nature and sheer scope, is a crime more likely committed
by states rather than by individuals. Too stringent a standard for establishing
genocidal intent allows egregious state behavior to go unpunished. Under such
circumstances, the Genocide Convention will effectively lose its power, giving
rise to a world where "[f]awlessness would replace the rule of law." 27
The real legal puzzle presented in the Croatia v. Serbia decision is this: as
parties to the 1948 Genocide Convention, Croatia and Serbia can only be
convicted under international law for acts of genocide and not for crimes
28against humanity. There is subsequently a significant lacuna in international
law in which crimes committed by states, such as mass extermination,
widespread rape, or ethnic cleansing, fall just below the standard of genocide
and will therefore go unpunished. To resolve this problem, certain academic
commentators, as well as the dissenting opinion of Judge Cangado Trindade,
argue for a looser definition of genocide as a means to hold states accountable
for crimes against humanity that would otherwise go unaddressed. Opponents
of this view believe that genocide, precisely due to its uniqueness, should be
difficult to prove, and therefore only applicable in the most extreme cases.29
Thus far, the ICJ's decisions seem to be in support of this latter view.
Law is a powerful reconciliation mechanism for recognizing and publicly
affirming individual losses. 30 The case of Croatia v. Serbia demonstrates how
24. See generally BEATRICE I. BONAFt, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATE AND
INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES (2009) (exploring the tensions between state
and individual responsibility in dominant paradigms of international criminal law).
25. See Prosecutor v. Popovi6, IT-02-57, Decision on Motion for Joinder (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 21, 2005), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/popovic/tdec/en/050921.htm;
Prosecutor v. Krsti6, IT-98-33, Appeals Chamber Judgment, (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Apr. 19, 2004), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/krstic/acjug/en/krs-aj040419e.pdf.
26. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Croat. v. Serb.) (Croatian Genocide) (Int'l. Ct. Justice Feb. 3, 2015) (Cangado Trinidade, J.,
dissenting), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/1 18/18432.pdf.
27. Id. 143.
28. Unlike the 1948 Genocide Convention, no other comprehensive treaty exists for crimes
against humanity.
29. William A. Schabas, Problems of International Codification: Were the Atrocities in
Cambodia andKosovo Genocide?, 35 NEW ENG. L. REv. 287, 301-02 (2001).
30. See generally MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING
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the unrelenting pursuit for the legal recognition of genocide-a crime meant
only to apply in the smallest subset of cases-can actually be antithetical to the
greater process of transitional justice. Genocide should not be employed to
shoulder the burden of addressing atrocities that cannot legally be classified as
such. As evidenced by the Croatia v. Serbia decision, law cannot be bent to
solve what are largely political problems. Rather than getting caught up in a
lengthy, meritless trial at the ICJ, doomed from the beginning, the respective
governments would have done better to engage in bilateral initiatives of post-
conflict justice. Pursuing this avenue would have given rise to a reconciliation
process between Croatia and Serbia that would certainly be more legally sound,
and possibly more expedient, than the one currently in place.
HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE (1998) (exploring the tension between post-conflict
policy approaches that prioritize the desire to punish perpetrators and those that focus on reconciliation).
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